The Tiger I heavy tank was the most famous tank of World War II. Built in relatively few numbers, rather slow and prone to mechanical problems, its 88mm gun

The images were brought to life by Welsh electrician Royston Leonard, 54, from Cardiff showing the German soldiers fighting and repairing their artillery on the bloodied battlegrounds of Europe.

The Germans were retreating on every front. They hadn’t had a real success against the Russians in years, and their last offensive at Kursk had been

Photographs of tanks from museums, collections and field days

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[Photo] A German tank commander surveying the field atop his Tiger I heavy tank, Russia, Mar 1943

After the Great War, neither Great Britain nor the United States of America devoted as much attention to the problems of tank development as did the German Wehrmacht, with a resulting lag in progre…

Even as early as 1939 it was obvious that the days of the little PzKpfw II tank were numbered, for it lacked both armament and armour, However, it was in production and quite reliable, so when the need arose for self-propelled artillery the PzKpfw II was selected to be the carrier for the 10.5- cm (4.13-in) leFH 18 field howitzer. The conversion of the tank hull to carry the howitzer was quite straightforward, for the howitzer was mounted behind an open topped armoured shield towards the rear of the hull and the area where the turret had been was armoured over and the space used for ammunition stowage. Maximum armour thickness was 18 mm (0.7 in). The result was the self-propelled howitzer known as the Wespe (wasp) though its full official designation was rather more cumbersome: leFH 18/2 auf Fgst Kpfw II (Sf) SdKfz 124 Wespe, but to everyone it was just the Wespe, It was a very popular little self-propelled weapon that soon gained for itself a reputation for reliability and mobility. The first of them were based on the PzKpfw II Ausf F chassis and went into action on the Eastern Front during 1943. On this front they were used by the divisional artillery batteries of the Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. They were usually organized into batteries of six howitzers with up to five batteries to an Abteilung (battalion). The Wespe was so successful in its artillery support role that Hitler himself made an order that all available PzKpfw II chassis production should be allocated to the Wespe alone, and the many other improvised weapons on the PzKpfw II chassis were dropped or their armament diverted to other chassis. The main Wespe construction centre was the Famo plant in Poland, and there production was so rapid that by mid-1944 682 examples had been built. Some time around that date manufacture of the Wespe ceased, but not before 158 had been completed without howitzers; these vehicles had the gap in the armour plate for the howitzer sealed off, the space behind the armour being used for resupply ammunition needed by batteries in the front line. A typical Wespe went into action carrying its crew of five, including the driver, and 32 rounds of ammunition. A Wespe battery was completely mobile, although some of the vehicles were soft-skinned trucks for carrying ammunition and other supplies. The forward observers were usually carried in light armoured vehicles although some batteries used ex- Czech or captured French tanks for this purpose. Fire orders were relayed back to the battery by radio, and from the battery fire command post the orders were further relayed to the gun positions by land lines, The howitzer carried on the Wespe was the standard 10.5-cm leFH 18 as used by towed batteries (although most were fitted with muzzle brakes) and so used the same ammunition, They also had the same range of 10675m (11,675 yards). Main variant: The Ammunition carrier Since the Wespe was cramped and could only carry limited ammo, the Munitionschlepper auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II, or more simply "Munitionschlepper auf Wespe", was designed as a weaponless variant, entirely filled with storage boxes containing 90 105 mm (4.13 in) shells, to complement the limited supply of regular Wespes (32 rounds). 159 were built in all, by the same manufacturer and two were attached to each unit (Abteilung) of six Wespes. The modifications were modular and each could be converted in the field to a regular SPG at a moment's notice. It must be noted that, before the Wespe, another SPG was based on the Panzer II chassis, the rare (only 12 built) 15 cm (5.9 in) sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) which fought in North Africa. The old, but still efficient, 150 mm (5.9 in) was much heavier and in order to cope with that the superstructure was lowered considerably, exposing the crew to small arms fire. The "Wespe" in action The Eastern Front took the biggest part of the Wespe production and the first Panzerartillerie Abteilung equipped with this vehicle appeared in March 1943. They saw extensive service alongside the Hummel, first at Kursk, then on all three Eastern fronts. They were so successful that, after reading reports, Hitler ordered all other conversions base on the Panzer II chassis to be stopped and reserved for the Wespe only. By the summer of 1944 some Abteilungen were sent in Normandy as reinforcements. They fought in Italy as well, taking part in the pounding of Allied forces in the Anzio pocket and defending the Caesar and Gustav lines. No less than 36 Panzer divisions, including SS and special units received Wespes, seeing active service on all fronts after 1943. By March 1945 307 were still in service. The crews praised its reliability and mobility but despised the lack of protection, both in thickness and height. The fighting compartment was also very cramped. The loaders working at the back end of the superstructure were the most exposed. Surviving Wespes can be seen at Saumur and Bayeux (France), Koblenz (Germany) and Kubinka (Russia). LINK

The SdKfz 251/20 was known as 'Uhu' (owl) and carried an infra-red searchlight to illuminate targets for small groups of Panther tanks at night. These variants were produced late in the war. The SdKfz 251 stands with the Panzer IV at the focal point of Wehrmacht armor. Its only rival for “best of its kind” was its US army counterpart. It was a bit of a military afterthought. German infantry had regularly ridden trucks to the combat zone during maneuvers since the Reichswehr years. In the early days of the armored force, motorcycles were so popular that five of the nine rifle companies in a panzer division’s rifle brigade rode them. Trucks and cycles, however, shared common problems: high vulnerability and limited off-road capacity. On the other hand, the panzers’ commitment to the principle of close tank-infantry cooperation was reinforced by the experiences of both sides in the Spanish Civil War, when tanks operating alone in broken or built-up terrain proved highly vulnerable to infantry who kept their heads. In a 1937 exercise, the modified civilian two-wheel-drive trucks assigned to the motorized infantry performed so badly that Guderian, still a mere colonel, directly challenged the armís commander in chief, Werner von Fritsch, to remedy the situation. “Had my advice been followed, we would now have a real armored force” were bold words, often cited to prove Guderian’s professional conviction, his moral courage, and his arrogance, depending on the author’s perspective. In fact, exercises and maneuvers were historically regarded as high-stress situations where such outbursts were more or less predictable, and Fritsch had a known high tolerance for young enthusiasts. Guderian, moreover, was widely understood as Lutz’s protégé (an alternate German word is Protektionskind, “favorite child”). In short, he got away with it. In concrete terms, Lutz and Guderian pressed for the development of an infantry-carrying vehicle with sufficient cross-country mobility to accompany tanks into action, and with enough armor and firepower to allow the crew to fight from it, if necessary. Such a vehicle had to meet two external requirements. It had to be cheap, and it could not interfere with tank production. That ruled out prima facie any kind of full-track design. Trucks were disqualified because any reasonably armored version would be heavy enough to overload suspensions and to lack off-road capacity. The answer came from the artillery—and indirectly from France. Even before World War I, truck companies on both sides of the Atlantic had been experimenting with replacing rear wheels with some sort of track in order to lessen ground pressure and improve mobility in mud, snow, and sand. Most prominent in this effort was French engineer Adolphe Kegresse, whose successful conversion of some of Russian Tsar Nicholas’s autos inspired the Putilov armaments works to consider a project for military half-tracks. After the war the French firm of Citroën developed several civilian versions, staging well-publicized desert crossings in North Africa and central Asia and attracting the particular attention of a French army still engaged in Morocco and southern Algeria. From the later 1920s, half-tracks made up a steadily increasing percentage of France’s military motor vehicles. Initially and primarily used as artillery and engineer vehicles, they found their way to the mounted troops as well. The French cavalry division as reorganized in 1932 had 150 armored versions as reconnaissance and combat vehicles. Another hundred, unarmored, carried the men and weapons of the battalion of Dragons portés (motorized dragoons) newly created for each mounted division. With such an example so ready at hand, as early as 1926 the Reichswehr’s Weapons Office began preparing its own design for half-track tractors. Daimler-Benz began working on a production version in 1931; by 1936, a series of vehicles from one ton to eighteen tons were on the drawing boards or in the field, mostly as artillery tractors. That reflected, in passing, the artillerís continued reluctance to accept the urging of the Lutz/Guderian school and fully mechanize the panzer divisions’ fire support by developing self-propelled mounts. This was more than commitment to branch self-interest and a tradition of towing guns into battle. Tracked vehicles were still fragile relative to the weight and the recoil of even a light field piece like the standard 105mm howitzer. In addition to probable effects on accuracy, a breakdown took the gun out of action as well. Not until well into the Cold War would even the US army abandon towed guns as standard divisional-level weapons. On the bright side from the panzers’ perspective, Hanomag’s three-ton tractor seemed well suited to carry a rifle squad. The armored chassis was provided by Büssing and the fit, if not perfect, was close enough for government work. At eight tons, with between 8 and 15mm of armor and mounts for two light machine guns, the 251 was tough and durable, eventually serving as the mount for a bewildering variety of weaponry. Tracks extending to nearly three-fourths of the chassis, plus a sophisticated steering system, compensated for an unpowered front axle and gave the vehicle better cross-country abilities than its US counterpart and eventual rival. The technical hair in the soup of the 251 was its complexity. It may be argued as well that neither the infantry nor the panzers sufficiently internalized the need to emphasize rapid, large-scale production. The first A-model versions did not begin service trials until 1939, and there would never be enough of them to equip more than one battalion in all but a few favored panzer divisions. Production delays bedeviled as well the 251’s smaller cousin. The SdKfz 250 developed out of a growing mid-1930s belief that reconnaissance was too vital an element of mobile war to be trusted to existing combinations of motorcycles and armored cars. At times it might be necessary to fight for information; at times it might be necessary to traverse rough ground to secure information. The solution was a half-sized half-track built on the chassis of the 1-ton artillery tractor. At 5.4 tons, with up to 14.5mm of armor, an open top, and a six-man crew, the 250 could move at almost 40 miles per hour, cover 300 miles on a single fueling, and, when necessary, put a few boots on the ground to search, destroy, and provide fire cover. It would not see service until 1940, but eventually it would prove almost as versatile a weapons platform as the 251. There were four main model modifications (Ausführung A through D), which formed the basis for at least 22 variants. The initial idea was for a vehicle that could be used to transport a single squad of panzergrenadiers to the battlefield protected from enemy small arms fire, and with some protection from artillery fire. In addition, the standard mounting of at least one MG 34 or MG 42 machine gun allowed the vehicle to provide support by fire for the infantry squad once they had disembarked in battle. Positive aspects of the open top included greater situational awareness and faster egress by the infantry, as well as the ability to throw grenades and fire over the top of the fighting compartment as necessary while remaining under good horizontal cover. The downside was a major vulnerability to all types of plunging fire; this included indirect fire from mortars and field artillery, as well as depressed-trajectory small arms fire from higher elevated positions, lobbed hand grenades, even Molotov's cocktails, and strafing by enemy aircraft. The first two models were produced in small numbers from 1939. A and B models can be identified by the structure of the nose armor, which comprised two trapezoidal armor panels - the lower of which had a cooling hatch. The B model, which began production in 1940, eliminated the fighting compartment's side vision slits. The C model, which started production in mid-1940, featured a simplified hexagonal-shaped forward armored plate for the engine. Models A through C had rear doors that bulged out. The C model had a large production run, but was quite complex to build, involving many angled plates that gave reasonable protection from small arms fire. From early 1943, the D model was developed with the purpose of halving the number of angled body plates, simplifying the design and thus speeding up the production. D models can be easily recognized by their single piece sloping rear (with flat doors). The standard personnel carrier version was equipped with a 7.92 mm MG 34 or MG 42 machine gun mounted at the front of the open compartment, above and behind the driver. A second machine gun could be mounted at the rear on an anti-aircraft mount. When comparing the M3 with the German Sdkfz.251 halftrack, you will find both of similar size, speed and weight, but the M3 had over 20% more internal capacity due to its boxy hull shape. The 251 halftrack was more thickly armored, and the armor was angled to derive the best protection possible. But, due to the greater horsepower from the US vehicle's engine, and the powered front axle, the M3 was a greatly superior vehicle for cross-country travel. Unfortunately, both vehicles were lacking in over-head protection, a problem that plagued occupants throughout WWII. LINK

T29 Heavy Tank The Heavy Tank T29 was an American heavy tank project started in March 1944 to counter the appearance of the German Tiger II heavy tank. The T26E3 medium tank (which entered service as the M26 Pershing), weighed around 45 short tons, but was not considered heavily enough armed or armored to counter … Continue reading "T29 Heavy Tank"

Anything within its sights of 2000 meters was marked as prey. Out of all the German tanks during World War II, the Sd Kfz 181 Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf E

“Everything about it was over-engineered (to an almost absurd degree)… but in the hands of an expert commander a lone Tiger could knock out dozens of enemy machines in a single engagement.” By Ben Hollingum, GermanWarMachine.com THE PANZERKAMPFWAGEN VI...